Opening Doors in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea by Banfill, James et al.
Opening Doors in the  
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea






Visiting research fellow, Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University Seoul, Republic of Korea 
James.banfill@alumni.psu.edu
James Banfill is a visiting research fellow at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies at Kyungnam University in Seoul, 
Korea. He has previously worked in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) on cultural projects, sports 
exchange, tourism, agricultural training and humanitarian aid monitoring. He holds a master’s in soil science from 
Pennsylvania State University, United States.
Jasmine Barrett
PhD candidate, Asia Institute, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia
Jasmine49@gmail.com
Jasmine Barrett is a PhD candidate at the Asia Institute, University of Melbourne. Her research focuses on the 
development of the disability sector in the DPRK. Her dissertation is tentatively titled ‘Disability in the DPRK: 
identity, social inclusion, and changing perceptions of disability’. Prior to joining the University of Melbourne, 
Jasmine was an entrepreneur partnering with the Korean Federation for the Protection of the Disabled to create 
employment for people with disability in the DPRK.
Carla Vitantonio
Country Director, CARE International, Havana, Cuba
Carla.vitantonio@care.ca
Humanitarian professional, author and activist Carla Vitantonio is a feminist and an advocate for human rights. In 
the past ten years, she has worked with governmental and non-governmental organisations in the DPRK, China, 
Myanmar, Thailand and Cuba. In each of those places, she stood beside the most vulnerable, being persons with 
disabilities, women and persons belonging to ethnic minorities. Carla believes in inclusive processes and the art 
of political negotiation. She has published two books with ADD Editore, Myanmar Swing (2021) and Pyongyang 
Blues (2019).
Nazanin Zadeh-Cummings
Associate Director of Research and Lecturer in Humanitarian Studies, Centre for Humanitarian Leadership, Deakin 
University, Melbourne, Australia
nazanin@deakin.edu.au
Nazanin Zadeh-Cummings has been researching humanitarian issues in the DPRK since 2014. She is both a lecturer 
in humanitarian studies and a graduate of a humanitarian studies master’s program, informing her interests in 
humanitarian pedagogy and the role of higher education and critical perspectives in the humanitarian sector. 
Nazanin received her PhD from the City University of Hong Kong in 2019.
THE HUMANITARIAN LEADER:
Opening Doors in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
WORKING PAPER 015 
J U N E  2 0 2 1
3
Editorial Office
The Centre For Humanitarian Leadership 
Deakin University 
221 Burwood Highway 
Burwood 3125 VIC 
Australia
Editor in Chief: Dr Nazanin Zadeh-Cummings 
ISSN: 2653-1011 (Online)
The Humanitarian Leader is made possible by support from the IKEA foundation.
The Centre for Humanitarian Leadership acknowledges the Australian Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples 
of this nation. We acknowledge the traditional custodians of the lands on which we work. We pay our respects to 
ancestors and Elders, past and present.
Copyright
This paper was prepared for the Centre for Humanitarian Leadership. The views expressed herein are those of 
the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Centre for Humanitarian Leadership. These papers are 
circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer reviewed.
© 2021 by James Banfill, Jasmine Barrett, Carla Vitantonio, and Nazanin Zadeh-Cummings. All rights reserved.
Cover image: Pyongyang International Airport, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 26 April 2012 © Jon Arnold 
Images Ltd / Alamy Stock Photo
4 Opening Doors in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
Abstract
This paper considers the opportunities for effective humanitarian 
collaboration in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). It brings 
together perspectives from three individuals with extensive lived experience 
working in the DPRK. Collectively, these authors have worked in various 
sectors of international humanitarian aid and other areas of engagement 
such as emergency response and preparedness, education, social enterprise 
and tourism. The paper draws from these experiences to present lessons on 
overcoming obstacles and harnessing opportunities in the DPRK.
How does this paper inform humanitarian leadership practice?
The paper informs humanitarian leadership by presenting experience-
based knowledge on the DPRK. It is rooted in the practice of international 
engagement, and contains concrete lessons for leaders not only looking to 
expand their understanding of the DPRK but of aid in authoritarian contexts 
more broadly.
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Opening doors in the DPRK:  
An introduction 
Nazanin Zadeh-Cummings
In 1995, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(DPRK, also known as North Korea) made its first wide-
scale appeal for international humanitarian aid while 
in the midst of a famine. Known as the Arduous March, 
between 1995 and 2000 the famine killed an estimated 
600,000 to 1 million North Koreans (Goodkind & West, 
2001). Humanitarian organisations, including large 
international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
United Nations (UN) agencies, Red Cross bodies, and 
small DPRK-focused groups began working in the 
country. Some groups established residency in the 
country, with foreign staff living full-time in the DPRK, 
and others worked on a non-resident basis, with regular 
or ad-hoc visits.
As the famine era subsided, it became clear that North 
Koreans still faced issues of food insecurity and access 
to adequate healthcare and sanitation. Some high-profile 
NGOs left the country in the early years of engagement, 
such as Médecins sans Frontières (MSF, or Doctors 
without Borders), who left in 1998 due to ‘lack of access, 
the inability to evaluate the quality of [their] program 
and the lack of any perspectives of improvement’ (Claus, 
as cited in MSF, 2014, p. 120). Others pivoted from 
emergency famine aid to programs that aimed to address 
protracted humanitarian issues, and humanitarian 
engagement moved from an acute emergency phase to 
addressing more long-term needs. In 2005, the DPRK 
announced the end of the humanitarian aid era in 
favour of development aid, requiring all NGOs to leave. 
This did interrupt or end the work of some groups, but 
others were able to renegotiate and remain, or had 
already begun working on projects that incorporated 
sustainability concerns.
Since its first nuclear test in 2006, the DPRK has 
been sanctioned under UN Security Council (UNSC) 
resolutions. As sanctions have become broader, 
they have had a wider applicability to humanitarian 
engagement, such as restrictions on metal items. In 
2017, UNSC resolution 2397 established humanitarian 
exemptions.  However,  this  process has been 
burdensome for aid groups, some of whom are small and 
not well-equipped to navigate expensive international 
bureaucratic processes; it has also weakened ability 
for agile and timely response, and, even with proper 
exemptions, humanitarians have faced challenges with 
procurement and banking (Zadeh-Cummings & Harris, 
2020). Secondary sanctions and travel bans from the 
United States have further complicated aid programs. 
In January 2020, the DPRK became one of the first 
countries in the world to close its border in response 
to the coronavirus (COVID-19) situation in China. The 
border remains shut at the time of writing, impacting 
tourism, trade and aid. Foreign humanitarian workers 
in the country faced growing restrictions and, by March 
2021, there were no UN or NGO workers remaining in 
the DPRK (O’Carroll, 2021).
It is at this moment of little foreign presence in the 
DPRK that the authors of this paper came together for 
an online panel at the 2021 Humanitarian Leadership 
Conference. The panel, which shared its title with this 
paper, was not borne of a desire to showcase the well-
documented and well-known challenges of working 
in the DPRK, but to highlight the opportunities for 
rewarding collaboration, effective partnership and 
impactful cooperation. My co-authors—James Banfill, 
Jasmine Barrett and Carla Vitantonio—bring deep 
experience to the discussion. Collectively, they lived, 
visited and worked in the DPRK across a variety of fields, 
including international humanitarian aid and other 
areas of engagement such as emergency response and 
preparedness, education, social enterprise and tourism. 
This paper captures the lessons and insights they shared 
at the conference.
Our inquiry is based on several ideas. The first is that 
the DPRK is not inherently shrouded in mystery. We 
reject outdated concepts of the DPRK as ‘crazy’ or 
‘unpredictable’—or, as Smith (2000) put it in her critique, 
the “bad, mad, sad” paradigms. Instead, we focus on 
lived experience to draw out knowable aspects of the 
DPRK and working with North Koreans. In many other 
countries, it would not need to be said that individuals 
differ from one another but, when discussing the 
DPRK, it bears reminding that North Koreans are not 
monolithic. Thus, while the authors here share lessons 
and thoughts, it is with the assumption that readers 
recognise that not all North Koreans are the same. 
The second core concept of this paper is knowledge-
sharing. We came together with the belief that sharing 
experiences in the DPRK would help provoke discussion 
to better prepare others to embark on work in the 
country. At the centre of this sharing and learning is the 
wellbeing of the North Korean people. This paper, and 
the panel behind it, is inspired by international solidarity 
with the citizens of the DPRK.
It is important to keep the welfare of North 
Korean people in the global conversation.
As the world waits for the DPRK to safely reopen 
its borders, the authors urge readers to seize this 
moment for reflection and learning. It is important to 
keep the welfare of North Korean people in the global 
conversation. We also encourage activism pointed at the 
barriers constructed by the international community. 
More work must be done to reduce the impact of 
sanctions on humanitarian engagement, including a 
reliable banking channel and smoother exemption 
processes, to open more doors.
The following three sections present lessons from the 
co-authors: Carla Vitantonio challenges the concept of 
the DPRK as a place unlike any other; Jasmine Barrett 
considers how to actually begin working in the DPRK, 
demystifying the process and showing the options 
6 Opening Doors in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
humanitarians can consider; and James Banfill asks 
how we can better prepare to work in North Korea. A 
conclusion collates the key messages.
Deconstructing the narrative  
of uniqueness 
Carla Vitantonio
I have been asked several times to talk about aid in the 
DPRK. On many of these occasions, I could not help but 
generate delusion in my audience: according to some, 
I don’t condemn the regime enough, thus allegedly 
positioning myself as ‘pro-DPRK’. Those who support 
the regime, on the other hand, consider my reflections 
too critical and unacceptable: I am not a friend. As a 
humanitarian and a professional, I cannot satisfy either 
group: I refuse to take judgemental, black-and-white 
positions. It is not my role to express judgement on a 
culture or country that is too far from my own to be 
neutrally observed. All I can do is collect information, 
observe and devolve my observations in order to help 
collective sense-making and understanding.1
For an aid worker, every context is unique, and a good 
part of our job is to be able to learn and adapt to the 
context in order to make humanitarian assistance as 
effective as possible. It is not a mystery that one of the 
main principles that drives humanitarian aid is ‘do no 
harm’; that is, ‘prevent and/or mitigate any adverse 
effects of interventions which can increase people’s 
vulnerability to both physical and psychosocial risk’ (UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees, 2015). Needless to 
say, in order not to cause harm one needs to know the 
existing structures and, to some extent, accept them; I 
will return to this later.
If we start from this assumption—that every context is 
unique—we are immediately challenging the narrative of 
the DPRK as ‘exceptional’: the post-colonial idea of aid 
workers arriving in a ruthless country and doing what 
they can (or what they want) has luckily been overcome. 
Today, humanitarian assistance must be accountable: 
to donors, to beneficiaries and, to some extent, to the 
host country, too. In this sense, even in the DPRK we 
must abide by local rules and regulations in order to 
deliver assistance. This does not mean that we agree 
with the local rules and regulations, just as we may not 
agree with those of Ethiopia or Colombia, to mention 
two countries where aid delivery is massive. It means 
that we recognise reality, we observe the setting and 
we consider the challenges and opportunities that this 
setting gives us. From this starting point, we might 
well decide to provide assistance through projects that 
challenge some norms and aim at a systemic change. 
A clear example is all the work done by Humanity & 
Inclusion (formerly Handicap International) that worked 
1  In fact, this is one of the two reasons that foreign publishers use 
when I ask why they won’t translate my book, Pyongyang Blues, 
into English. The other is that I do not hold a United States, United 
Kingdom or Republic of Korea passport.
alongside the DPRK government to bring them first 
to the creation of a national law on disability, then to 
signing the UN Convention for the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (UNCRPD), and finally to its ratification. 
It was a huge change, if we imagine that until 2000 
the official position of the DPRK government was that 
there were no persons with disability in the country. 
Now, not only does the country have a quasi-civil 
society organisation—the Korean Federation for the 
Protection of the Disabled (KFPD)—working alongside 
the government to improve living conditions for people 
with disabilities, there are visible changes in Korean 
society, in favour of the inclusion of people with all kinds 
of disabilities. This stage of development was reached 
only through a constant exchange and dialogue with 
local authorities and organisations.
Today, humanitarian assistance must be 
accountable: to donors, to beneficiaries and, 
to some extent, to the host country, too.
I would like to deepen my considerations on the 
possibility (or not) of delivering aid in the DPRK. When 
we look at implementation modalities, we should recall 
the four humanitarian principles and see if they can 
be respected: humanity, neutrality, independence and 
impartiality. According to many, the one principle at 
stake in the DPRK is impartiality. Impartiality means 
that “humanitarian action must be carried out on the 
basis of need alone, giving priority to the most urgent 
cases of distress and making no distinctions on the 
basis of nationality, race, gender, religious belief, class 
or political opinions” (UN Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, 2017).
The fact that the DPRK government restricts the 
area of aid to six out of nine provinces (excluding one 
province because it is too far to be reached,2 and the 
remaining two because there are nuclear plants and, 
allegedly,3 labour camps) brings many to question the 
capacity of aid agencies to be able to reach the most 
vulnerable. I am afraid there is not a unique response 
to this question; however, this situation is actually very 
frequent in aid. Similar challenges arise in countries 
such as Myanmar, Ethiopia, Cuba ( just to name three), 
and aid agencies find their way around, without seeing 
their effectiveness questioned. The fact of the matter is 
2  Historically things have been different. Until 2006, all NGOs 
and UN agencies could reach the North Hamgyong Region, and had 
projects there. When the situation improved and the DPRK changed 
rules of access, NGOs progressively withdrew, and, as of the most 
recent available data, the only resident agencies currently operating 
there are WFP and UNICEF.
3  I use the word ‘allegedly’ because I have never personally seen 
one; I don’t have the skills, nor do I think it’s my role, to correctly 
interpret aerial pictures.
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that, if we contextualise humanitarian assistance, there 
is no context in the world where these four principles 
can completely and transparently be respected. In 
addition, part of our work as humanitarians is to do our 
best in respecting the four principles, while walking 
a precarious line and balancing a set of unfortunate 
circumstances. In the DPRK, resident agencies found 
a reasonable way to maintain some impartiality: to 
deliver aid, the main rule was “no access, no aid”. It is 
a very strong statement that was somehow respected 
by Korean authorities, and allowed NGOs to be able 
to conduct some monitoring, thus avoiding aid being 
delivered, as many feared, to the military, or to groups 
that did not need it.
“No access, no aid”  is only one of several examples I 
could draw on to prove that delivering aid in the DPRK 
needs as much tact, diplomacy, strategy, and respect 
of the local context as is required in other parts of 
the world.
How to begin working in the DPRK: 
A practical guide for humanitarian 
practitioners 
Jasmine Barrett
This section is a practical guide for humanitarian 
practitioners on how to set up a humanitarian 
project and begin working in the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea, often referred to as DPRK, North 
Korea or Korea.4 My aim is to demystify the process, 
and demonstrate that it is not as complicated as it is 
perceived to be. I have been engaged in humanitarian 
work in the DPRK for ten years, and I would like to share 
some of my personal experience with readers.
There are very few humanitarian organisations operating 
in the DPRK and aid appeals are chronically underfunded. 
With a population of 25 million people, almost half are 
classified by the UN as “in need”, yet only a quarter 
are ‘targeted’ for humanitarian aid (UN Humanitarian 
Country Team [HCT], 2019). I hope that this paper will 
spur more humanitarian practitioners and organisations 
to reach out to local partners in the DPRK and start a 
conversation about how they can work together. With so 
few humanitarian actors present in the country, even a 
small project can be immensely appreciated by the locals, 
and have a big impact. There are both resident and non-
resident NGOs and UN agencies working in the DPRK, but 
this paper will focus on setting up an aid program as a 
non-resident NGO, because this would be the most logical 
starting point for almost all humanitarian organisations.
The first step is to find a local partner. Many, but not all, 
local partners have their own websites that outline the 
scope of their work, their goals and interests, and who 
their existing foreign partners are. A list of local partner 
websites is included as an appendix.
4  The people of the DPRK do not agree with the use of the term 
‘North Korea’, so this section will respectfully use ‘DPRK’ or ‘Korea.
The National Coordinating Committee, a division of 
the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, partners with six 
UN agencies present in the DPRK, while the Korean 
European Cooperation Coordination Agency (KECCA) 
partners with the resident European NGOs (UN DPR 
Korea, 2014). The DPRK Red Cross Society and the 
Ministry of Public Health partner with numerous 
resident and non-resident NGOs. Other local partners 
include the Korea Education Fund, which targets 
children through schools and orphanages; Care for the 
Elderly, whose remit includes people with age-related 
disabilities; and the Korea Green Fund, which specialises 
in clean, green technology, addressing climate change 
and protecting the environment. The KFPD targets 
people with disabilities and is responsible for the 
implementation of the UNCRPD; for full disclosure, KFPD 
is my local partner and I find them an excellent group 
to work with. There are a dozen other local partners, 
including the Korea–America Private Exchange Society 
(KAPES), which works exclusively with North American 
NGOs, and the Compatriots Association, which works 
exclusively with the Korean diaspora.
Local partners perform a number of essential functions 
and will be critical to the success of a project. It has been 
reported in the news media that when practitioners go 
to the DPRK there are ‘minders’ who watch them all the 
time, however, they do a lot more than simply ‘mind’ 
people. Basically, a local partner will facilitate everything 
a practitioner does in-country. They will apply for their 
visa, pick them up from the airport, and host them. They 
will facilitate logistics, distribution and transportation. 
They will organise their schedule and apply for 
permission for them to visit project sites for monitoring 
and evaluation. They will set up meetings, facilitate 
introductions, and act as interpreters. In short, having a 
local partner is like having local staff, but they are much 
more than that. They are guides, confidants and teachers. 
When making the initial contact with a local partner, I 
recommend asking one of their existing foreign partners 
for an introduction. Despite email addresses being listed 
on their websites, it is still necessary for practitioners to 
ask for an introduction and register their email address, 
otherwise the emails will bounce back.
Local partners perform a number of essential 
functions and will be critical to the success 
of a project.
The DPRK is one of the most sanctioned countries in the 
world. Therefore, it is important to be familiar with the 
UN sanctions regime and how to request a humanitarian 
exemption in the early stages of planning. Details of how 
to do this can be found on the UNSC website listed in 
the appendix. Humanitarian practitioners will also need 
to check if there are additional unilateral sanctions in 
the country where they are operating. Local partners 
will not be able to help navigate the sanctions regime, as 
they do not see them as legitimate.
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Banking and logistics need to be considered. Local 
partners can help with logistics such as sending goods 
via shipping container to Nampo port, or sending goods 
by truck over the China–DPRK border. However, due to 
sanctions, there are no international banking channels 
available, so it is recommended that visitors seek advice 
from other humanitarian practitioners about how to 
safely and legally move their money.
On a practitioner’s first visit, a local partner will pick 
them up from the airport, drive them to their hotel, and 
stay with them for the duration of their visit. Itineraries 
must be organised and emailed in advance; while small 
adjustments can usually be accommodated, it will be 
too late to make major changes on arrival. A well-
planned itinerary is one of the keys to a fruitful visit, 
so it is important to include all the people and places 
one would like to visit, and plan tangible outcomes in 
order to maintain momentum. Cynics may say, “They 
only let you see what they want you to see,” but this 
has not been my experience at all. It is surprising how 
accommodating they can be with your itinerary—all 
one has to do is ask.
In summary, to get a humanitarian project off the 
ground: find a local partner, become familiar with the 
sanctions, and network with humanitarian practitioners 
who have experience in-country. A stand-up comedian 
once told me a simple rule that he followed while 
working in China. He said, “Avoid the ‘three Ts’ [Tibet, 
Taiwan and Tiananmen] and you will be fine.” A similar 
rule applies in the DPRK in terms of avoiding sensitive 
political topics. As humanitarian practitioners, our 
core business is not politics, but the humanitarian 
imperative. After years of working in the DPRK, trusted 
friendships have emerged with my local partners, and 
together we have witnessed tangible improvements in 
the lives of our beneficiaries.
Can we better prepare to work in  
North Korea and with North Koreans? 
James Banfill
North Korea is a difficult place to gain experience. 
The practical reality of working in the country means 
interacting with North Koreans face-to-face. Non-
North Korean5 f ield practitioners typically gain 
an understanding of this operational environment 
through first-hand exposure over multiple years and 
visits. In pre-COVID-19 times, the DPRK was already 
one of the most isolated countries in the world, and 
opportunities for exposure remain limited. Although 
over 300 non-North Korean organisations have 
worked in the DPRK since the mid 1990s, only about 
5  The term ‘non-North Korean’ is used to catch all actors working 
in the field in North Korea, including South Koreans or Koreans 
based overseas.
50 maintain an active presence.6 Most organisations 
maintain only a few dedicated staff due to in-country 
restrictions on free movement, staff and donor fatigue, 
political sensitivities and relatively high operating 
costs.7 The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated North 
Korea’s isolation. The current context raises questions 
about our ability to maintain effective and sustained 
humanitarian engagement over time. This section 
will make the case that preparation and training are 
important for working in North Korea, and propose 
ways of making such training relevant to working on 
the ground.
Why should we prepare to work in  
North Korea?
1. The need for trust in a complex and nuanced 
operating environment
The particular restrictions that the DPRK government 
places on non-North Korean organisations, such as 
limits on access, are well-documented (see, for example, 
Flake & Snyder, 2003). Working in North Korea, there 
are almost always operational challenges, stemming 
from the country’s isolation, poor infrastructure and 
political sensitivities. These restrictions and challenges 
are compounded by an information-poor environment 
with numerous political sensitivities.
North Korea is not monolithic spatially or temporally—
regions often differ, trends change over time, and 
some periods of working in the country are more 
difficult or sensitive than others, largely inf luenced 
by political factors, both internal and external. 
Strong relationships with North Korean partners are 
instrumental in accurately assessing and navigating 
these changing environments and obtaining relevant 
real-time (or near real-time) information on the 
ground. These relationships are often based on trust 
both at the organisational level and, perhaps more 
importantly, the interpersonal level (Zadeh-Cummings, 
2019; Glenk, 2020). While long-term partnerships help 
maintain trust on an organisation level, trust on the 
interpersonal level takes time, often on the scale of 
years, to develop.
2. Current capacity is lacking
Humanitarian challenges on the ground are complex and 
interconnected over a wide range of fields, including food 
insecurity, environmental degradation, infrastructure 
decay, chronic disease, et cetera (UN HCT, 2020). The 
scale of these challenges can vary vastly by region 
6  These organisations range in size from large international 
organisations, such as the World Food Programme, to small, 
privately funded non-governmental organisations, and even private 
philanthropists without any legal status. As such, the exact number 
active in the country at any given time remains unclear.
7  Operational costs (such as rent and telecommunications) for 
non-North Koreans to maintain a resident presence in Pyongyang 
are on par with international cities, such as Beijing.
9 Opening Doors in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
or community. Such complex and interdisciplinary 
problems, or ‘wicked problems’, are often beyond the 
ability of individuals to fully comprehend, let alone solve 
(Brown et al., 2010) further highlighting the need for 
coordination and knowledge-sharing not only across 
organisations but across technical fields. The current 
capacity of both North Koreans and the international 
community is inadequate to meet the magnitude of 
challenges. Realistically addressing these problems in 
the future will require an expansion of not only material 
and financial resources but also human resources. In the 
event of an emergency, this may need to occur rapidly.
The unintended actions and mistakes of  
non-North Koreans can have real 
consequences for North Korean’s careers, 
livelihoods, even lives.
3. Mistakes have consequences
Lastly, the harsh reality of working in North Korea is 
that the unintended actions and mistakes of non-North 
Koreans can have real consequences for North Korean’s 
careers, livelihoods, even lives. North Koreans are often 
held responsible for the actions of their non-North 
Korean partners by the country’s extensive security 
apparatus. While non-North Koreans will likely be able 
to sense periods of increased tension or stress among 
North Korean partners, the exact nature of potential 
consequences (or dangers) may never be known or only 
understood ex post facto. Non-North Koreans working 
in North Korea need to be cognisant that, in the process 
of their work, colleagues may be transferred, fall out of 
favour or disappear. International personnel need to 
prepare to cope with this high-stress environment and 
its potential consequences (Miller, 2012). For the sake 
of North Korean partners, we must also do our best to 
ensure the international community is not making the 
same mistakes repeatedly due to lack of awareness.
How might we prepare to work in  
North Korea?
1. More communication and coordination
After more than two and a half decades of engagement 
with North Korea, the degree of communication and 
coordination among non-North Korean actors is not 
proportional to the scale, severity, complexity and 
uncertainties of the situation. One reason for this is 
the relative sensitivity of North Korean authorities 
to detailed public discussion of work done inside 
the country. In some cases, knowledge-sharing may 
be counterproductive. Public discussion can lead 
to problems for in-country partners or, in extreme 
cases, lead to the banning of non-North Koreans from 
continuing to work in the country.8
8  There is anecdotal evidence of non-North Koreans reporting on 
other non-North Koreans to North Korean authorities.
Furthermore, there are silos of information across 
nationalities and generations as well as between 
organisations and individuals. Trust not only needs to 
be built between non-North Korean actors and North 
Koreans, but also between non-North Korean actors 
themselves. Such trust requires a recognition of the 
need for preparation and coordinated dialogue about the 
scope and scale of such preparation. Compared to the 
1990s, or even the early 2000s, non-North Korean actors 
have numerous technical means for knowledge-sharing 
(for example, digital crisis maps, online databases 
and Zoom).
2. Distilling lessons learned
Previous attempts have been made to distil lessons 
learned from interactions with North Korea in general, 
particularly in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Snyder, 
1999; Saccone, 2003). From a practical perspective, the 
most enduring and instructive paper for working in 
North Korea is titled ‘Unlikely partners: humanitarian 
aid agencies and North Korea’ (Reed, 2004). Reed 
identifies certain principles that have led to success 
in the field, such as build trust, appoint good staff, 
cultivate counterpart relations, prove yourself, design 
transparent projects, collaborate with other agencies, 
and persist. Each one of these principles encompasses 
numerous operational considerations in the field. Since 
Reed’s publication, the international community has had 
an additional decade and a half of experience in North 
Korea that can be harnessed for better outcomes.
3. Scenario- or simulation-based training
Scenario-based training or simulations—so-called 
‘serious games’—may be a potential  means of 
approximating the challenges, or sets of challenges, 
faced by practitioners in North Korea and transferring 
past lessons learned to newcomers in the field. Serious 
games have been employed to train field personnel for 
uncertain and high-stress environments, such as conflict 
situations as well as disaster and emergency response. 
In other words, can we approximate what it feels like 
to be in and work in North Korea?9 What might such a 
serious game look like for the North Korean context?
As mentioned, non-North Korean organisations can 
be extremely cautious about the public sharing of 
information due to the sensitivities of the DPRK 
government. However, it should be possible to 
summarise past scenarios or dilemmas faced by field 
practitioners and strip them of information identifying 
locations, time and personas. What remains would be a 
generalised scenario, activity or dilemma for the trainee 
(or even the experienced practitioner) to attempt to 
problem-solve. The overall goal would be to compile 
a set of scenarios based on real events so that any 
person can quickly encounter both the diverse range 
and complex depth of problems faced on the ground in 
North Korea.
9  For an excellent narrative introduction to this topic, see 
Abrahamian (2020).
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While it is important to note that serious games 
have limits and are not a substitute for actual field 
experience, serious games can also improve empathy, 
build teamwork and stimulate discussion (Solinska-
Nowak et al., 2018). In the North Korean field, all of these 
are desirable not only as takeaways for individuals, 
but in building relationships between non-North 
Korean actors.
*
North Korea is not an easy place to work for many 
reasons and opportunities to gain experience in 
the country are limited. Over the past two and a half 
decades, non-North Korean actors have accrued a 
wide-range of experience working in the North Korean 
operational environment. However, lessons-learned and 
coordination remain limited and disparate. In the midst 
of the COVID-19 pandemic, while North Korean remains 
closed for the foreseeable future, we can prepare to 
work in the country in the future.
Conclusion 
James Banfill, Jasmine Barrett,  
Carla Vitantonio and  
Nazanin Zadeh-Cummings
This working paper collated three pieces from 
individuals with significant experience working in the 
DPRK. In ‘Deconstructing the narrative of uniqueness’, 
Carla Vitantonio challenged the concept of the DPRK 
as “exceptional”; in ‘How to begin working in DPRK: A 
practical guide for humanitarian practitioners’, Jasmine 
Barrett outlined how humanitarians can practically 
approach building links in the DPRK; and in ‘Can 
we better prepare to work in North Korea and with 
North Koreans?’, James Banfill considered how the 
international community can be better equipped for 
engaging in the DPRK. While each section presented 
perspectives, ideas and advice from its respective 
author, the overarching thread tying them together is 
the belief in the importance of cooperative engagement 
in the DPRK.
The authors present this work at a time when COVID-
19 restrictions are severely hampering the international 
community’s ability to engage with North Korea. 
This paper’s message of understanding and pursuing 
engagement in the DPRK is relevant both during times 
of surges in cooperation and in times like these, where 
opportunities are sparse. We do not deny the challenges 
or specific considerations of working in the DPRK, but 
ask readers to continue to imagine possibilities and 
explore ways to open doors.
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Appendix: DPRK humanitarian resources
UN agencies in the DPRK
https://dprkorea.un.org/
Local partners











Korean Red Cross Foundation
http://www.friend.com.kp/index.php/krcf
Korean Federation for the Protection of the Disabled
http://naenara.com.kp/sites/kfpd/
Ministry of Public Health
http://www.moph.gov.kp/en/
UN Security Council Sanctions and Humanitarian Exemptions
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/exemptions-measures/humanitarian-exemption-requests




Vitantonio, C. (2019). Pyongyang Blues. Add Editore.
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